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Abstract—Machine learning best practice statements have
proliferated, but there is a lack of consensus on what the
standards should be. For fairness standards in particular, there
is little guidance on how fairness might be achieved in practice.
Specifically, fairness in errors (both false negatives and false
positives) can pose a problem of how to set weights, how to
make unavoidable tradeoffs, and how to judge models that
present different kinds of errors across racial groups. This
paper considers the consequences of having higher rates of
false positives for one racial group and higher rates of false
negatives for another racial group. The paper examines how
different errors in justice settings can present problems for
machine learning applications, the limits of computation for
resolving tradeoffs, and how solutions might have to be crafted
through courageous conversations with leadership, line workers,
stakeholders, and impacted communities.
Index Terms—statistics, machine learning, false positives, false
negatives, fairness, equity, race
I. INTRODUCTION
As machine learning best practice and ethical practice
guidelines have proliferated, there has been a lack of consensus
of what should be included in the rules. Each set of ethical
guidelines is unique. Even so, there have been some common
themes. One recurrent axiom is that machine learning models
should be fair and equitable. Fairness, though, is not always
clear and there is no consensus definition. Many papers have
catalogued different definitions of fairness that might be ap-
plied to machine learning. For example, Verma and Rubin [1]
identify more than twenty different forms of equity that have
been proposed for machine learning. Fairness and equity in
machine learning are especially critical when applied to justice
settings. Machine learning that is used to create decision
support tools around which people should penetrate the system
further, or should be diverted, or should receive a particular
disposition, or should be placed in a secured facility should
be fair. These kinds of decisions, with all their consequences,
must be fair to fulfil the idea of justice. It is a standard set out
in the U.S. Constitution. The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment establishes that government entities,
including justice systems, must treat people in the same
situation in the same way. While the ethical standard is clear in
this regard, it is not clear how machine learning can uphold this
Constitutional right. Most ethical machine learning guidelines
provide a stance on fairness without granular guidance on how
to work in a setting that is not itself fair or with data that
are tainted with prejudice bias from history or from structural
inequality. Guidance from IBM, for example, says that, ”AI
must be designed to minimize bias and promote inclusive
representation” [2]. There is not an argument on the other
side of thisnobody is arguing in favor of bias. However, the
path to minimizing bias is not always clear.
II. FAIRNESS IN CONTEXT
A machine learning model might reduce bias in one sense,
such as in the distribution of predictive scores across racial
groups, while not reducing bias in a different sense, such as in
the likelihood across racial groups of the outcome occurring.
It could even be that reducing bias in one area makes bias
worse in another area. The ethical stance of fairness alone
does not provide guidance on what to do when fairness in one
aspect comes at the expense of fairness in a different aspect.
Further, it does not say how much accuracy a machine learning
model should be willing to sacrifice in order to achieve
greater fairness. How important is fairness for a model that
is fundamentally not accurate? In justice settings in particular,
where the best features for predicting future justice system
involvement are also all correlated with race, there is no easy
path to manifesting the axiom of fairness in actual machine
learning practice. What is unbiased machine learning when
all available features are biased? This tension becomes even
more crystalline when considering machine learning errors. In
particular, the frequency of false positives might be higher than
the frequency of false negatives for one group but be reversed
for another group. Because the base rate of the predicted
outcome (re-arrest) is markedly higher for one group than
another group, false positive rates and false negative rates are
going to be different for each group. In this case, how should
fairness be understood? Especially in justice settings, where
false positives mean something very different in terms of costs
than false negatives, is fairness achievable when one group has
more false positives and another has more false negatives?
III. SETTING FALSE POSITIVE AND FALSE NEGATIVE
WEIGHTS
All machine learning modeling must take some stand on the
weights of false positives and false negatives. Often machine
learning algorithm packages set equal weights for false posi-
tives and false negatives. For example, the sklearn package for
Python [3] allows for the setting of ”class weight” which has
a default weight of 1 for all classes. Otherwise specific weights
can be applied. The setting also allows for a ”balanced” mode
that sets weights inversely proportional to class frequencies.
Similarly, the caret package for R [4] allows weights to be
set to impose a heavier cost when errors are made in the
minority class. While weights can be a parameter for training a
machine learning model, they are not computationally solved.
The setting of weights on false positives and false negatives
is a normative decision that the data scientist must make.
The algorithm allows for different weights, but there is not
computationally determined ”best” weights. The decision on
weights, including the decision to leave the default in place, is
based on some valuation of which is worst: is it worse for the
model to produce false positives or false negatives. Analytics
tools, like the Receiver Operating Characteristic, make this
point clear. The ROC curve shows how trade-offs might be
made, where the boundary of possible trade-offs lies, but it
does not decide which point on that curve best fulfills the
values and mission of the organization or the project.
IV. EQUAL WEIGHTS?
In some cases, false negatives and false positives might
warrant equal weights. Because both represent errors, they
both signify something about the algorithm’s accuracy. A
determination to maximize accuracy might not care about
a distinction between false negatives and false positives as
they are both errors detracting from accuracy. A modeling
effort that improved its AUC score might not care whether
that improvement came from reducing false positives or false
negatives. In some settings, though, like medical diagnostics
for example, the difference between false negatives and false
positives might play an important role. Whether a positive
diagnostic test should result in a new medical procedure,
for example, might depend greatly on what kind of error
the diagnostic test produces and the potential upsides and
downside of the medical procedure itself. Also, weighing false
positives and false negatives might depend on how invasive
the procedure was and what the likelihood of success was.
There are no hard and fast rules for deciding how much
weight to put on false positives and false negatives. There
is no computational solution. Weights have to be decided on
the basis of values and mission, not on data and calculation.
V. JUSTICE SETTINGS
In justice environments, decision support tools developed
from statistical modeling and machine learning have become
the professional standard. These tools can inform justice
decisions around detention, pre-trial release, dispositions and
sentencing, probation, parole, safety and security inside an
institution, release, among others. While there are some com-
mon features (like legal history), they vary by content, by
length, by calculation mechanism, among other things. In
all cases, though, they make recommendations about either
further penetration into the justice system, or a path toward
justice system exit, or simply to release someone without any
further intervention. These tools sometimes work as a triage
mechanism, sorting people into different levels of intervention.
At other times, they work to inform degree of consequence of
punitiveness. Often they are established as a direct result of
machine learning, other times statistical findings are moderated
through local preferences and stakeholder values. There are
two questions about false positives and false negatives that are
especially critical for those creating machine learning models
in justice settings. One, in a justice setting, are false positive
and false negatives equally significant? And two, in a justice
setting, who ought to determine the trade-off between more
or less false positives of false negatives? In the justice setting,
the difference between a false positive and a false negative
is significant. A false positive can mean over-intervention. It
can mean an unnecessary and harmful application of punitive
measures, like detention or placement in a corrections facility.
In this sense, a false positive is largely negative. Interventions
can have negative consequences for individuals, families, and
communities. The repercussions of interventions like probation
or placement can make educational achievement much less
likely, can make employment less secure [5], and can make
future justice system involvement more likely. One study
found that in the year following incarceration, only 55 percent
of people had any income at all [6]. One study found that any
contact with the juvenile justice system can lead to double the
likelihood of being arrested as an adult, compared to youth
with similar behaviors who were not involved with the justice
system [7]. And incarceration can have impacts across the life
span, including on divorce and separation [8] and on things
like worse health outcomes, financial struggles, and impaired
social standing [9]. In this way, false positives are clearly
negative and are not insignificant. Justice system intervention
can also include supportive interventions. Interventions like
mentorship, community based positive supports, or employ-
ment readiness have the potential to be helpful, even for
people who are unlikely to be re-arrested. Depending on how
welcome and how restrictive these kinds of positive supports
are, this kind of false positive is likely to be less harmful than
interventions based on control and the restriction of individual
liberty. False positives might also be a waste of resources,
targeting interventions to someone who was not otherwise
going to get into trouble again. For prevention goals, there
is nothing to prevent if the person was not likely to be re-
arrested in the future. Reciprocally, false negatives can have a
different set of important consequences. False negatives occur
when a justice system decides to not intervene for a person
who actually was likely to later be re-arrested or referred into
the justice system. This error is most costly when the justice
system does not intervene and the person goes on to hurt
someone in the community, causes harm in the community,
or is arrested for a new law violation. The impact of a false
negative has the potential to be large. People working in justice
systems can sometimes find these kinds of events to be the
hardest part of the work. It is understandable that no one would
want their well-intentioned decision to lead to harm in their
community. Both false positives and false negatives have the
potential to be costly to individuals and to the community.
Part of the difficulty of assigning weights to them is that false
positives (over-intervention) tend to occur much more often
than the kind of false negative (under-intervention) that really
stirs a community. Without a decision support system, a risk
assessment, or a machine learning model, there is sometimes
an incentive to over-intervene; it may be better to accept many
smaller costs borne by separate individuals than to feel the
consequences of one large cost borne by the whole community.
VI. DO JUSTICE SYSTEMS PAY ATTENTION TO FALSE
POSITIVES AND FALSE NEGATIVES?
Regardless of how the details of different costs associated
with over- and under-intervention might be tabulated, most
justice systems do not explicitly take a stance on which kind of
error is worse than the other, and by how much. Not only does
this kind of calculation not occur broadly, it does not occur
in a targeted way that would lead to specific class weights for
justice system decision support systems, risk assessments, and
machine learning models. Scanning risk assessment validation
reports, it is apparent that the focus is most typically on overall
accuracy as indicated by the area under the Receiver Operating
Characteristic curve, or AUC, or maybe simple correlations.
For example, the ”Validation Study of the Youth Level of
Service (YLS) Assessment in Hennepin County” [10] does
not examine errors at all and does not mention false positives
or false negatives. Similarly, the ”Long-Term Validation of
the Youth Assessment and Screening Instrument (YASI) in
New York State Juvenile Probation” [11] reports area under
the curve statistics, but does not examine false positive or
false negative rates either overall or across different version
of the tool. Little consideration is given to whether weights
were determined for false positives and false negatives, or
how weights were determined, or how different weights might
impact accuracy.
VII. BASE RATES AND RACE
Base rates are the rate at which an outcome occurs for
someone who is currently in the justice system. It is a
prospective likelihood for someone who has already been
referred, or arrested, or adjudicated, or tried, or sentenced,
about whether they will return to the justice system in the
future. It is sometimes defined around re-referrals, re-arrests,
re-adjudications, etc. Base rates are commonly different across
racial groups. For Black people and for White people, in
particular, there is a persistent difference across time and place
in base rates. Base rates for people who are in the justice
system currently are different from more general outcome
rates or even recidivism rates. Base rates are only for a
recurrence, not an initial occurrence. They are not for the
overall population, just for the system involved group. And
they are not for the lifetime of the person, usually only one
or two years. They are measured by following a cohort of
people who entered the justice system during one time and
then following them to check whether they re-enter the justice
system during some follow-up period of time. There are no set
standards for risk assessment follow up time periods, which
outcomes to track, or which types of events relate to the index
event versus are independent events. Because of this, it is
difficult to compare base rates between models, jurisdictions,
or over time. Lower base rates might lead to more false
positives. In justice settings, it is the norm for one racial
group (such as White youth) to have lower base rates of the
outcome occurring than others (such as Black youth). This
difference in base rates between groups is likely not due to
race. Differences by race are likely due to structural factors
that differ between the racial groups. The crucial importance
of base rates in justice setting models is the difference by race.
Many model studies do not report base rates by race at all (see
” Evaluating the predictive validity of the COMPAS Risk and
Needs Assessment System” [12], ”The Criminal Court Assess-
ment Tool: Development and Validation” [13], ”Re-validating
the Federal Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument (PTRA): A
Research Summary” [14], or ”Long-Term Validation of the
Youth Assessment and Screening Instrument (YASI) in New
York State Juvenile Probation” [15] as just a few examples),
but some do. One study found that the Florida PACT showed
a re-adjudication rate of 40.4 percent for Black youth and 33.8
percent for White youth [16]. The same study found that the
Virginia YASI showed a base rate of 19.9 percent for White
youth and 33.0 percent for Black youth. The ”Validation of
Virginia’s Juvenile Risk Assessment Instrument” [17] reported
that the 12-month re-arrest rate was 41.1 percent for Black
youth and 28.4 for Black youth. In sum, many risk assessment
validation studies do not examine base rates by racial group at
all, and those that do look at base rates by racial group report
markedly higher base rates for Black people than for White
people.
VIII. BASE RATES AND ERROR TYPES
The importance of examining base rates by race is that
differences in base rates translate directly into differences in
false positives and false negatives. If a model predicts that
40 percent of all who are classified as high-risk are likely
to experience a re-arrest, and if White people experience the
outcome at a rate of 30 percent while Black people experience
the outcome at a rate of 50 percent, then there will be more
false positives for White people and more false negatives
for Black people. It is not a failure of the machine learning
algorithm that produces different frequencies of false positives
and false negatives for different racial groups. It is not a
computational error. The reason for the different error rates
is that the base rates themselves are different. The problem
of different rates of false positives and false negatives across
racial groups in justice settings is twofold. One, base rates
differ across racial groups because of historical and structural
racism. Structural racism from things like policies of redlining
neighborhoods [18], of branch banking [19], of policing [20]
of broken windows and stop and frisk [21], among others,
can lead to higher rates of arrest for Black people than for
White people. The relationship between crime rates and race
is complex, and a review of that extensive literature is beyond
the scope here. However, differences in base rates across racial
groups are not free from an underlying prejudice bias in the
data. The systems that produce crime data are not free from
institutional and structural bias. Two, the justice system in the
United States is overwhelmingly disproportionately Black. In
a system that has become more, not less, racially disparate in
recent decades, what does it mean for decision support tools
to work differently for Black people and for White people?
Does the cost of a false positive or of a false negative mean
something different for Black people than for White people?
Does a legacy of over-involvement of Black people in criminal
justice count in the arithmetic of decision-making errors?
IX. ACHIEVING FAIRNESS
Fairness in machine learning in the justice system cannot be
achieved through computation alone. Better machine learning
algorithms, more features, or rebalanced samples will not be
enough to claim fairness. And more sophisticated statistical
methods, like latent variable analysis, structural equation mod-
eling, propensity score matching, or factor analysis will also
not be enough to sate the demand for fairness. The only path
for machine learning to be fair, is to consider how fair the
underlying decision making is. Careful consideration of each
decision point, with input from leaders, workers, stakeholders,
and people from impacted communities, can help clarify what
the purpose of the system is, what the purpose of an interven-
tion is, what the goal of punishment is. Government agencies
can move fairness conversations forward, with support from
the data and from machine learning models, only by having
courageous conversations with a broad set of voices about
what a community wants and what it is willing to tolerate
to get what it wants.
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